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I. INTRODUCTION
As we gather in Miami, the site of the 1994 Summit of the
Americas, to discuss "Free Trade in the Western Hemisphere," it
is clear that we stand at an historic crossroads for the future
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law; Visiting Professor of
Law, University of California at Davis School of Law, 1997-1998. J.D., Harvard Law
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economic prosperity and political freedom of all Americans-
North, Central, and South. The original Summit of the Americas
lies more than two years in our past and the second Summit of
the Americas, to take place in Santiago, Chile in March 1998,1
lies less than one year into our future. A series of important
events has and will continue to unfold between these two points
in the history of the Western Hemisphere.
In December 1994, the heads of state of all thirty-four
American democracies declared a commitment to integrate their
economies into a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the
year 2005.2 Since then, the governments have begun to lay the
groundwork for FTAA negotiations. For example, Trade Minis-
terial Meetings occurred in June 1995, March 1996, and May
1997.3 In addition, several vice-ministerial sessions have been
held and eleven FTAA working groups have been busy assem-
bling and systematizing data on different aspects of trade, with
the assistance of the Organization of American States (OAS), In-
ter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 4
1. See Administration's Fast.Track Measure May be Ready by End of March, Lang
Says, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 406 (Mar. 5, 1997).
2. See Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec.
11, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 808, 810-14 (1995) [hereinafter Declaration of Principles]. As envi-
sioned, the FTAA will stretch from Alaska to Argentina and include over 850 million con-
sumers. See Ministerial Meeting Adopts Hemispheric Trade Declaration, 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1137 (July 5, 1995) [hereinafter Ministerial Meeting]; U.S. Exports to Western
Hemisphere Could Reach $200 Billion Next Year, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1447 (Sept.
21, 1994).
3. The trade ministers met in Denver in July 1995 and in Cartagena, Colombia in
March 1996. See Ministerial Meeting, supra note 2, at 1137-38; The Summit of the
Americas Second Ministerial Trade Meeting Joint Declaration Adopted March 21, 1996,
13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 538 (Mar. 27, 1996) [hereinafter Second Ministerial]. The May
1997 meeting of the hemisphere's trade ministers took place in Belo Horizonte, Brazil.
See id. at 539.
4. See Organization of American States-Trade Unit, Toward Free Trade in the
Americas, at 1, 54-57 (on file with the OAS and (visited Mar. .20, 1997)
<http://www.oas.org/>) [hereinafter Toward Free Trade]. Trade ministers authorized the
establishment of seven working groups (i.e., those on market access, customs procedures
and rules of origin, investment, standards and technical barriers to trade, sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, subsidies, and small economies) at the Denver Ministerial. See
James Stamps, Free Trade Area for the Americas: Chile is the Linchpin, 5 MEX. TRADE &
L. REP. 7 (Oct. 1995). They then launched four additional working groups (i.e., those on
government procurement, intellectual property, services, and competition policy) at the
Cartagena Ministerial. See FTAA Ministers Agree to Establish a Dispute Settlement
Working Group, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 510 (Mar. 27, 1996) [hereinafter FTAA Minis-
ters Agree].
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We now stand at a crossroads because the thirty-four Ameri-
can democracies soon will have to make crucial decisions about
key aspects of hemispheric integration-decisions that, up to this
point, they have had the luxury of avoiding behind the veneer of
essential, yet preliminary data-gathering activity. These fun-
damental issues include: Will the countries approach the negoti-
ating table individually or in trading blocs?5 What path to free
trade will the negotiations take?6 What pace will negotiations
assume? 7 What new institutions, if any, will be created to facili-
tate the negotiations? Will the FTAA be comprehensive or lim-
ited in scope?8 The ability of representatives of the thirty-four
American democracies to successfully confront these issues at
the Santiago Summit in 1998 will determine the future of eco-
nomic integration in this hemisphere.
5. "MERCOSUR comprises Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and plans
to negotiate as a bloc in the FTAA talks ... . [A]II three NAFTA countries would be ne-
gotiating individually and not as part of NAFTA." NAFTA Negotiator Says FTAA Should
be Bridge to Customs Union, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 478 (Mar. 12, 1997).
6. The trade ministers had an opportunity to begin to address the "path" issue at
the Belo Horizonte Ministerial in May 1997. See Mercosur-Mexico Pact's Main Points
Decided, Details Remain Unresolved, Brazil's Lampreia Says, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1490 (Sept. 25, 1996). The approach most recently suggested by the United States is to
begin with WTO obligations, add to those the "best" elements from existing trade ar-
rangements in the hemisphere, and add to that combination "additional obligations that
neither [the WTO nor existing pacts] currently addresses." See United States Wants
Fewer Groups in FTAA Negotiations, Eizenstat Says, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 477 (Mar.
12, 1997).
7. Currently, the timing (or pace) of negotiations is a major point of contention.
The United States has proposed a two-stage strategy, involving: first, initial negotiations
(on market access, customs procedures and rules of origin, investment, standards and
technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, government procure-
ment, intellectual property rights, and services) beginning after the Santiago Summit
and, second, later negotiations (on subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties,
competition policy, and smaller economies) starting in 2000, all of which are to be con-
cluded by 2005. See U.S. and Mercosur Disagree on FTAA Negotiating Timetable, 14 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 409 (Mar. 5, 1997). In contrast, the MERCOSUR countries, and par-
ticularly Brazil, desire a three-stage approach, starting in 1998 with customs procedures,
rules of origin, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures; progressing in 2000 to subsi-
dies; and "leaving the issue of market access for last, starting in 2003." Id. at 409. The
Brazilians wish to move slowly on market access matters ostensibly because they and
other "Latin nations have made major concessions in recent years and need time to ad-
just their economies to increasing competition from imports." Id. Nonetheless, "there
appear[s] to be an 'emerging consensus' that the launch of negotiations should take place
at the summit to be held in March 1998 in Chile." Id.
8. "The June [1995] ministerial failed to resolve two key points of disagreement
about the future path of FTAA negotiations: (1) the scope of the FTAA negotiations and
(2) the approach to be used to achieve the FTAA." Stamps, supra note 4, at 8.
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A number of people who study and write about international
trade organization and the Western Hemisphere believe that the
structure and systems of a future FTAA may resemble those of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).9 Recently,
for example, Professor Boris Kozolchyk, a pre-eminent scholar on
Latin America and trade and a U.S. Delegate to the United Na-
tions Commission for International Trade, wrote, "[i]n my opin-
ion, NAFTA's model, and not that of supra-national federalism is
more likely to become universally acceptable. In the grand
scheme of international cooperative forces, NAFTA is the model
most consistent with the nature of the modern nation state and
with the limits of man's cooperative impulses."' 0
In this Article, the final piece in a trilogy on trade dispute
resolution in the Western Hemisphere," I examine the general
topic of dispute resolution in a future Free Trade Area of the
Americas, focusing on the following questions: Are the FTAA
negotiators ultimately more likely to adopt a legalistic or prag-
matic approach to dispute resolution? What institutions will
they create, if any, to administer FTAA dispute settlement? Will
NAFTA's dispute resolution mechanisms serve as the models for
the devices used in an integrated hemisphere? In short, what is
the probable shape of dispute resolution under a future FTAA?
In Part II of this Article, I begin to address these points by
describing the work undertaken under the auspices of the FTAA
in the field of dispute resolution since the 1994 Miami Summit
and the three models of dispute settlement from which FTAA
mechanisms are most likely to be drawn, i.e., the trade dispute
resolution systems of the Mercado Comiln del Sur
(MERCOSUR), NAFTA, and the World Trade Organization
(WTO).
In Part III, I present my theory of the manner in which dis-
pute resolution systems in an FTAA may unfold. I conclude that
although NAFTA-like dispute settlement systems will at some
9. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 296 and 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
10. Boris Kozolchyk, NAFTA in the Grand and Small Scheme of Things, 13 ARiz. J.
INVL & COMP. L. 135, 144 (1996).
11. See David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA.. Lessons form the Early
Experience, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 163 (1997) [hereinafter Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under
NAFTA]; David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under MERCOSUR from 1991 to 1996: Im-
plications for the Formation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 3 NAFTA LAW & Bus.
REV. AM. 3 (1997) [hereinafter Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under MERCOSUR].
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point prevail in the FTAA, this may not be entirely true during
the FTAA's inception, nor, perhaps, in periods of advanced de-
velopment in this hemispheric institution. Initially, the Ameri-
can democracies are likely to utilize flexible, informal dispute
settlement mechanisms more akin to those now used in
MERCOSUR than those in place in NAFTA and the WTO.
During this first stage of development, several features of
NAFTA's dispute settlement structures may be present; how-
ever, the practice will be decidedly non-NAFTA. Only after a
period of years will reliance substantially increase on more for-
mal, rule-driven devices such as those present in NAFTA and the
WTO.
II. EXISTING MODELS FOR FTAA DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Since the 1994 Miami Summit, the American democracies
have taken a two-stage approach to developing an FTAA: 1) from
the 1994 Summit to the eve of the 1998 Santiago Summit, the
parties are to build a database containing information about
various components of a prospective free trade agreement, and 2)
from the 1998 Summit to the year 2005, the parties will negoti-
ate the agreement and secure its ratification, using the database
created in the first stage. 12 In the Plan of Action issued at the
Miami Summit, the hemisphere's leaders designated numerous
matters for study during the initial phase, including subsidies,
intellectual property rights, government procurement, technical
barriers to trade, rules of origin, and dispute resolution. 13 Al-
though working groups were created relatively early in the proc-
ess to collect data on all other issues designated in the Plan of
Action, no working group on FTAA dispute resolution was
formed until May 1997.14
12. "The FTAA process is unfolding in a series of ministerial and vice-ministerial
meetings and with 11 working groups engaged in data-gathering efforts .... Negotia-
tions have not started yet." Three Framework Proposals to Guide Talks at this Week's
FTAA Vice-Ministers'Meeting, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 357 (Feb. 26, 1997) [hereinafter
Three Framework Proposals].
13. See Declaration of Principles, supra note 2, art. II(9)(3).
14. "Dispute settlement was the only issue addressed at the Miami Summit's Action
Plan that was neither taken up at the June 1995 ministerial nor mentioned as an item to
be considered at the March 1996 meeting. Several sources reported that there was
'widespread feeling' that efforts at this stage should support the dispute procedures in
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and not strive to set up new procedures in the
FTAA context at this time." Stamps, supra note 4, at 7. See also Ministerial Meeting,
supra note 2, at 1138 ("On the issue of dispute resolution, a U.S. trade official said the
19971
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It was not until the Cartagena Ministerial in March 1996
that the trade ministers began to focus attention on dispute
resolution under a future FTAA. At that time, the ministers
agreed to establish a working group on Dispute Settlement (but
not until the Belo Horizonte Ministerial)15 and "asked the Or-
ganization of American States to start compiling information on
dispute settlement mechanisms used in bilateral and subre-
gional pacts in the Hemisphere."'16 The OAS finished its compi-
lation of this material by May 1997, in time for presentation in
Belo Horizonte.17
Much like the Analytical Compendium of Western Hemi-
sphere Trade Arrangements the OAS produced in 1995,18 the
compilation of data on dispute resolution covers the dispute set-
tlement regimes now operative in MERCOSUR, NAFTA, the
WTO, the Andean Group, the Central American Common Mar-
ket (CACM), the Caribbean Community and Common Market
(CARICOM), the Group of Three, and Chile's bilateral free trade
agreements with Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. 19
The dispute settlement mechanisms of these trading arrange-
ments, then, will become the models for such mechanisms in a
future FTAA. Of these models, the dispute resolution systems of
MERCOSUR, NAFTA, and the WTO are likely to be the most
influential in shaping dispute resolution structures for the
FTAA.20 A brief description of the essential contours of dispute
resolution under each of these trading organizations follows. 21
ministers felt it best to concentrate on the current mechanism within the World Trade
Organization while continuing to work out the obligations of each nation in the FTAA.").
15. See FTAA Ministers Agree, supra note 4, at 510; FTAA Dispute Settlement Work-
ing Group has been Under Discussion, Sources Say, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 478 (Mar.
20, 1996).
16. Second Ministerial, supra note 3, at 538.
17. Telephone Interview with Jeannette M.F. Tramhel, Legal Counsel, Department
of International Law, Secretariat for Legal Affairs, Organization of American States
(Mar. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Tramhel Interview].
18. See generally OAS TRADE UNIT, AN ANALYTICAL COMPENDIUM OF WESTERN
HEMISPHERE TRADE ARRANGEMENTS (1995).
19. The members of the major subregional trading groups of the Western Hemi-
sphere are: NAFTA (the United States, Canada, and Mexico), CARICOM (Antigua and
Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, and Trinidad and To-
bago), CACM (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua),
MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), the Group of Three (Mexico,
Colombia, and Venezuela), and the Andean Group (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and
Venezuela). See Toward Free Trade, supra note 4, at 5.
20. Tramhell Interview, supra note 17.
21. For more exhaustive descriptions of the MERCOSUR, NAFTA, and WTO dis-
602 [Vol. 28:3
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A. Dispute Resolution in the Mercado Comdn del
Sur
MERCOSUR is a budding customs union between Argen-
tina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, created in 1991 by the
Treaty of Asuncion. 22 The organization's present dispute resolu-
tion processes did not exist when the Treaty of Asunci6n took ef-
fect in November 1991. From that time until April 1993, the
MERCOSUR parties relied upon an extremely elementary three-
step dispute resolution process that began with direct negotia-
tions between the disputing countries, then led to evaluation by
MERCOSUR's Common Market Group (CMG), and, failing
resolution at these early stages, ended with review by
MERCOSUR's Council of the Common Market (Council).28 The
disputes which could be resolved within this preliminary system
were limited strictly to conflicts between the member states
arising "as a result of the application of the Treaty [of Asun-
cion]." 24 No provision was made for the settlement of disputes
between a member state and private party, a MERCOSUR insti-
tution and private party, a member state and a MERCOSUR in-
stitution, or exclusively between private parties.2 5
MERCOSUR's current dispute resolution system is premised
on two accords: the Brasilia Protocol, which took effect in April
1993,26 and the Ouro Preto Protocol, which took effect in January
1996.27 This system provides for the resolution of two general
pute settlement processes, see Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under MERCOSUR, supra note
11; Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA, supra note 11; PIERRE PESCATORE ET AL.,
HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1996).
22. See Treaty Establishing a Common Market Between the Argentine Republic,
the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay, and the Eastern Republic of
Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1044 (1991) [hereinafter Treaty of Asunci6n]. The
Treaty of Asunci6n was signed in March 1991 and entered into force in November 1991.
See JORGE PREZ OTERMIN, EL MERCADO COMUN DEL SUR: DESDE ASUNCION A OURO
PRETo-ASPECTOS JURIDICOS-INSTITUcIONALES 11 (1995).
23. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 22, annex 11(1). The eight-member Council,
MERCOSUR's supreme institution, is composed of the ministers of foreign affairs and
ministers of the economy of the four member states. Id. art. 10. The sixteen-member
CMG consists of four representatives of each country's ministry of foreign affairs, eco-
nomic ministry, and central bank. Id. art. 13.
24. Id. annex III(1).
25. See OTERMIN, supra note 22, at 30.
26. Protocol of Brasilia for the Resolution of Controversies, Dec. 12, 1991, 6 INTER-
AM. LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1992) [hereinafter Brasilia Protocol].
27. Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunci6n on the Institutional Structure of
MERCOSUR, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1244 (1995) [hereinafter Ouro Preto Protocol].
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types of controversies: those between member states
("government-to-government" or "public" disputes) and those be-
tween private firms or individuals and a member state
("private/public" disputes).
In general terms, disputes between member states concern-
ing the interpretation, application, or breach of the Treaty of
Asunci6n, its related accords, or any decision of the Council or
CMG are subject to a three-stage dispute resolution process in-
volving direct negotiations, intervention by the CMG, and bind-
ing arbitration.28 The Brasilia Protocol stipulates that direct ne-
gotiations are not to last more than fifteen days beyond the date
on which they were requested and that CMG intervention should
end no later than thirty days from the date the dispute was
submitted to the CMG.29 Assuming a public dispute advances
through negotiations and the CMG to an arbitral finding against
a MERCOSUR country, and assuming the country fails to com-
ply with the tribunal's decision, the other disputant(s) may adopt
"temporary compensatory measures," such as the suspension of
trade concessions or other equivalent steps designed to obtain
compliance. 30
Private/public disputes may be initiated by any natural or
legal person who resides or is headquartered in Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, or Uruguay and who is adversely affected by a
MERCOSUR country's breach of the Treaty of Asunci6n or its
related accords, or by certain official acts of the MERCOSUR in-
stitutions.8 ' Assuming the National Section of the CMG receives
a claim which it elects to pursue, the controversy may become
the subject of discussions with the National Section of the offend-
ing country or, at the CMG's discretion, the subject of review by
an ad hoc, three-member panel of experts.' 2 In the event the
panel of experts verifies the private party's claim, any
MERCOSUR country may demand that the violator either take
28. Brasilia Protocol, supra note 26, art. 1 and chs. 2-4. A slightly more complicated
process is involved in resolving public disputes within the "sphere of competence" of the
MERCOSUR Trade Commission, a new entity created by the Ouro Preto Protocol in
1994. Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 27, art. 1. For a full description of that process,
see Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under MERCOSUR, supra note 11, at 15-18.
29. Brasilia Protocol, supra note 26, arts. 3(2), 4(2)-6.
30. Id. art. 23. The Brasilia Protocol provides that arbitral panels are to issue a
written decision by no later than ninety days after being formed. Id. art. 20(1).
31. Id. arts. 25, 26(1); Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 27, art. 43.
32. Brasilia Protocol, supra note 26, arts. 27-30.
[Vol. 28:3
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corrective steps or annul the measure in question.88 If that de-
mand is not met in a timely fashion, the MERCOSUR country
making the demand may resort directly to the arbitral proceed-
ings created for resolving public disputes.
34
In practice, from the group's inception in 1991 through 1996,
the most remarkable feature of trade dispute resolution in
MERCOSUR has been the parties' reluctance to use the forego-
ing provisions. Although various trade-related disputes arose
during this period, the MERCOSUR parties did not rely on the
structure they had created to settle such disputes.35 Two factors
may help to explain the nonuse of the organization's formal dis-
pute settlement systems: 1) "a cultural predisposition toward in-
formal, non-public, non-adversarial methods of conflict resolu-
tion," and 2) "the active and direct involvement of the presidents
of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay" in resolving such
controversies.
386
B. Dispute Resolution Under the North American
Free Trade Agreement
Unlike MERCOSUR, which is evolving toward a customs
union, NAFTA is merely a free trade pact. In constructing a free
trade zone, the United States, Canada, and Mexico put in place
four major dispute settlement mechanisms. NAFTA itself con-
tains a mechanism for the resolution of general controversies in-
volving the interpretation, application, or breach of the Agree-
ment (Chapter 20, Section B) and a separate device specifically
for resolving antidumping and countervailing duty disputes
(Chapter 19). In addition, the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (Environmental Side Agreement)
3 7
and North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (Labor
Side Agreement)8 8 each contain their own dispute resolution sys-
tems.
33. Id. art. 32.
34. Id.
35. See Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under MERCOSUR, supra note 11, at 20-24.
36. Id. at 24-27.
37. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993,
Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) [hereinafter NAAEC].
38. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC].
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In general terms, Chapter 20 provides for a three-stage dis-
pute resolution process that escalates as necessary from consul-
tations, to a meeting of NAFTA's Free Trade Commission, to
nonbinding arbitration. 39 Chapter 20 envisions that consulta-
tions will last no more than thirty days from the request for con-
sultation and, similarly, that the Free Trade Commission will
endeavor to resolve a controversy within thirty days after it first
meets to consider the matter40 Assuming a dispute works its
way through consultations and the Free Trade Commission to an
arbitral finding against a NAFTA country, Chapter 20 provides
that the disputing countries are to attempt to reach a "mutually
satisfactory resolution."4' If this does not occur within thirty
days of receipt of the arbitral panel's final report, the complain-
ing party may suspend NAFTA benefits to the offending party
until the time an agreed resolution is reached. 42
Under Chapter 19, a private Canadian, Mexican, or Ameri-
can business subject to a final antidumping determination of one
of the three governments may request that the determination be
reviewed by a binational arbitral panel. 43 Chapter 19 panels are
charged with assessing "whether such determination was in ac-
cordance with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the
importing Party."44 Panels are to issue a final decision no later
than 315 days after a request for a panel is made.45 A panel
ruling that a final determination is not in compliance with the
importing Party's law is binding on the Party.46 "No Party may
provide in its domestic legislation for an appeal from a panel de-
cision to its domestic courts."47
The Environmental Side Agreement provides for the resolu-
tion of two general types of controversies: those not involving al-
legations that a NAFTA government has failed to enforce its en-
39. NAFTA, supra note 9, arts. 2006-2008. The Free Trade Commission consists of
cabinet-level officials of the NAFTA parties. Id. art. 2001.
40. Id. arts. 2007(1)(a), 2008(1).
41. Id. art. 2019. Chapter 20 provides that panels shall issue a final report in a dis-
pute by no later than 120 days after the last panelist is selected. Id. arts. 2016(2),
2017(1)-(3).
42. Id. art. 2019(1).
43. Id. arts. 1904(2), 1911.
44. Id. art. 1904(2).
45. Id. art. 1904(14).
46. Id. art. 1904(9).
47. Id. art. 1904(11). Chapter 19 includes an elaborate set of procedures for ensur-
ing that the member states comply with panel rulings. See id. art. 1905.
[Vol. 28:3
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vironmental laws (nonenforcement matters) and those in which a
government's failure to enforce its environmental law is directly
at issue (enforcement matters). 48 The category of enforcement
matters further is divided into cases of mere failure to enforce
environmental laws and of a "persistent pattern" of failure to en-
force environmental laws. 49  As to all cases other than
"persistent pattern" cases, the Environmental Secretariat is
authorized only to conduct an investigation, subject to limitation
by the Council of the Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion, and to prepare a report, potentially for distribution to the
public. 50 Disputes involving allegations of a "persistent pattern"
of failure to enforce environmental laws are subject to a more in-
tricate settlement process, involving consultations, a special
session of the Council, and, ultimately, an arbitral panel.
51 If it
does not occur voluntarily, compliance with adverse determina-
tions by an arbitral panel is to be obtained by imposing a
"monetary enforcement assessment" on the offending country or
by suspending NAFTA benefits to it.52
The Labor Side Agreement creates a four-step dispute set-
tlement process that progresses sequentially from initial consul-
tations between the disputants' National Administrative Offices
(NAOs), to ministerial consultations, to expert evaluations, and
to further consultations which may lead to nonbinding arbitra-
tion.53 A broadly defined category of "labor law" matters may be
subjected only to the first two dispute resolution steps.
54 A
smaller category of labor-related controversies may proceed to
expert evaluation. 55 Only three types of labor controversies,
those involving occupational safety and health, child labor, or
48. NAAEC, supra note 37, arts. 13-15, 22-36.
49. Id. arts. 14, 15, 22-36.
50. Id. art. 15.
51. Id. arts. 22-34.
52. Id. arts. 34(5), 36(1).
53. NAALC, supra note 38, pts. 4, 5.
54. ld. arts. 21(1), 22(1). Consultations may involve the following labor matters:
freedom of association and the right to organize; the right to bargain collectively; the
right to strike; prohibition of forced labor; labor protections for children and young per-
sons; minimum employment standards (such as minimum wages and overtime pay);
elimination of employment discrimination; equal pay for men and women; prevention of
occupational injuries and illnesses; compensation in cases of occupational injuries and
illnesses; and protection of migrant workers. Id. art. 49.
55. Id. art. 23. Expert evaluation extends to all of the labor matters listed in the
previous footnote except freedom of association, the right to organize, the right to bar-
gain collectively, and the right to strike. Id.
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minimum wage concerns, may advance to the fourth stage of
dispute settlement.5 6 As is true for environmental cases, assum-
ing compliance with a labor panel's ruling does not occur volun-
tarily, compliance is to be obtained by imposing a "monetary en-
forcement assessment" on the offending country, and if that fails
to earn compliance, by suspending NAFTA benefits to the coun-
try.
57
From January 1994, when NAFTA came into force, until De-
cember 1996, forty-six separate controversies formally entered
NAFTA's four primary dispute resolution systems.58 The early
experiences from these NAFTA cases reveal several significant
lessons for dispute settlement in a future FTAA. First, certain
devices, such as the Chapter 19 mechanism for resolving anti-
dumping and countervailing duty conflicts, can be extremely suc-
cessful in generating relatively speedy and conclusive results. 59
In addition, even informal, nonbinding dispute settlement tech-
niques, such as those contained in the Environmental Side
Agreement, can effectively address serious social conditions. 60
Second, governments operating in good faith and with a sub-
stantial interest in the success of a free trade arrangement will
comply with dispute settlement rulings, even if such rulings are
strongly adverse to them.61 Third, the parties to a free trade
agreement will try, but, more often than not, will fail to abide by
time limits specified for undertaking various dispute settlement
activities; however, this practice does not necessarily imperil the
underlying agreement and may, in fact, add a desirable measure
of flexibility to the dispute resolution process. 62 Fourth, from
time to time, dispute resolution mechanisms will be expected to
bend to the domestic political needs of the trading partners. 63
The best mechanism of the sort is one that limits such deviations
to a handful of only the most essential political matters. Finally,
although it is clear that no free trade agreement can be formed
which does not contain a general dispute resolution device, such
56. Id. art. 27(1).
57. Id. arts. 39(4), 41.
58. This includes eight cases under Chapter 20, 24 disputes under Chapter 19, and
seven disputes each under the Environmental and Labor Side Agreements. See Lopez,
Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA, supra note 11, at 168, 175, 188, 195.
59. See id. at 201.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 202-04.
62. See id. at 204-06.
63. See id. at 206-07.
[Vol. 28:3
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
as the device contained in Chapter 20, one should not underes-
timate the enormous practical importance of including in an
agreement a Chapter 19-type process for addressing antidump-
ing and countervailing duty disputes.
64
C. Dispute Resolution in the World Trade
Organization
All of the American democracies except Panama are mem-
bers of the World Trade Organization. 65 Although the WTO was
inaugurated only in January 1995, its dispute resolution
mechanisms derive from the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). 66 The WTO dispute settlement framework is
set forth primarily in the Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
6 7 which establishes
a three-stage dispute resolution process involving consultations,
panel review, and appellate review.
68
A WTO member may request consultations with any other
member concerning action by the latter that affects the operation
of the Agreement Establishing the WTO or various multilateral
and plurilateral trade agreements or both within the WTO's su-
pervision.69 The member to which the request is made "shall en-
ter into consultations in good faith within a period of no more
than 30 days after the date of receipt of the request, with a view
to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution."
70 If consultations
do not resolve the dispute within sixty days after the date of the
request for consultations, the complaining party may ask that a
64. See id. at 207.
65. See World Trade Organization, WTO Membership (visited Mar. 20, 1997)
<http://www.wto.org/>. Panama has requested to join the WTO. See id.
66. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations], Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1143 (1994); Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Law-
yers Triumph Over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389, 391-401 (1995) (tracing the evolution of
dispute resolution under GATT from its inception to 1994).
67. Final Act, annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settle-
ment of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
68. Id. arts. 4-19. By mutual agreement, disputing parties may opt out of the three-
stage dispute resolution process and submit a WTO controversy to binding arbitration.
Id. art. 25.
69. Id. arts. 1, 4, app. I.
70. Id. art. 4(3). The member that requested consultations may directly request
that a WTO dispute resolution panel be established in the event the member to which
the request was made does not reply to the request or enter consultations. Id.
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dispute resolution panel be formed. 71
Upon a member's request, the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB), a newly created WTO institution, shall establish a panel,
unless the DSB decides by consensus not to do So. 72 The task of
the panel is to examine the controversy in light of the trade
agreement(s) in question and "to make such findings as will as-
sist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the
rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s)."73 Ordinarily,
WTO panels are to consist of three "governmental and/or non-
governmental individuals" (none of whom can be a citizen of any
disputing party) nominated by the WTO Secretariat. 74 Panel
proceedings are designed to progress from the parties' initial
written submissions to a final panel report in a period not to ex-
ceed nine months.75 "Within 60 days after the date of circulation
of a panel report to the Members, the report shall be adopted at
a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the
DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus
not to adopt the report."76
Any such appeal is made to a standing WTO Appellate Body
composed of seven experts in law and international trade who
are unaffiliated with any government. 77 The Appellate Body is to
issue a report upholding, modifying, or reversing the legal find-
71. Id. art. 4(7). In lieu of requesting a panel, or while panel proceedings are ongo-
ing, the disputants may attempt resolution through good offices, conciliation, and media-
tion. Id. art. 5.
72. Id. arts. 1(1), 6(1). Potentially, the DSB includes all members of the WTO. See
Young, supra note 66, at 399. A "consensus" is reached within the DSB "if no Member,
present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the
proposed decision." Final Act, supra note 67, art. 1(4). "But since the requesting country
would presumably not join such a consensus, as a practical matter the DSB must always
establish a panel when requested." Young, supra note 66, at 402.
73. Final Act, supra note 67, art. 7(1).
74. Id. art. 8.
75. Id. art. 12(8), (9).
76. Id. art. 16(4). By virtue of the difficulty of obtaining consensus against adopting
a panel's report under the 1994 innovations to traditional GATT practice, Professor
Young describes this as "a rule of almost automatic adoption of panel reports." Young,
supro note 66, at 402.
77. Final Act, supra note 67, art. 17(1)-(3). Although the Appellate Body is com-
posed of seven persons, it hears individual appeals sitting in three-member panels. Id.
art. 17(1). The current members of the WTO Appellate Body are James Bacchus (United
States), Christopher Beeby (New Zealand), Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (Germany), Said El-
Naggar (Egypt), Florentino Feliciano (Philippines), Julio Lacarte Muro (Uruguay), and
Mitsuo Matsushita (Japan). See WTO Appellate Body's Seven Members Expected to Begin
Work in Early 1996, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2018 (Dec. 6, 1995).
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ings and conclusions of the dispute settlement panel no later
than ninety days from the formal notice of appeal.
78 "An Appel-
late Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and uncondition-
ally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB de-
cides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within
30 days following its circulation to the Members."
79
Thereafter, the DSB is to continuously monitor the imple-
mentation of its recommendations or rulings until the issue is
resolved.80 In the event a disputant fails to comply with the
DSB's directives within a "reasonable period of time," the party
failing to comply may elect to pay appropriate compensation to
the injured party; alternatively, the injured party may request
that the DSB authorize it to suspend the application of conces-
sions or other obligations under the trade agreement(s) involved
in the dispute to the party not in compliance.
81
The Uruguay Round also produced new provisions concern-
ing antidumping and countervailing duty disputes.
8 2 With re-
spect to antidumping measures, when an importing member has
taken final action to levy definitive antidumping duties on the
products of an exporting member and previously requested con-
sultations have failed to resolve the controversy, the exporting
member may request that a WTO panel be established.
83 Upon
request, the DSB shall form a panel, and the panel, in turn, shall
assess whether the importing member's investigation underlying
the antidumping duties was proper, unbiased, and objective.
8 4
"If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation
was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have
reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be over-
78. Final Act, supra note 67, art. 17(5), (13).
79. Id. art. 17(14).
80. Id. art. 21.
81. Id. arts. 21(3), 22.
82. See generally James R. Cannon, Jr., Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Cases, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTATION LEGISLATION 359
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996).
83. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, art. 17(4), (5), re-
printed in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1453 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement on
Implementation]. The rules and procedures that govern DSU panels also apply to panels
established by the DSB to review antidumping controversies. See Final Act, supra note
67, art. 1(2), app. 2.




With respect to countervailing measures, a WTO member
which believes that another member is maintaining a prohibited
subsidy may request consultations with such member.86 If con-
sultations fail to produce a solution within thirty days of the re-
quest for consultations, any disputant may request that the DSB
establish a panel, which the DSB shall do unless it decides by
consensus not to do so. 87 Within ninety days of the panel's for-
mation, the panel shall circulate a final report to all WTO mem-
bers, recommending that the subsidy in question be withdrawn
immediately if it is determined to be prohibited.88 Within thirty
days thereafter, the DSB shall adopt the panel's report, unless
one of the disputants decides to appeal the report or the DSB
decides by consensus not to adopt the report.8 9 In the event a
member maintaining a prohibited subsidy fails to comply with
the DSB's recommendation to withdraw the subsidy, the DSB
shall authorize the complaining member to take "appropriate
countermeasures." 90
Numerous trade disputes have been submitted to the WTO
in the brief time since its creation. From January 1995 to Octo-
ber 1996, the WTO received fifty-nine requests for consultation
in forty-one different cases.91 "The former [GATT] workload av-
eraged about three formal complaints per year during the 1970s
and some eleven complaints per year during the 1980s. ' '92 Ac-
cording to a member of the WTO Appellate Body, "[t]here were
more cases filed in the first year of the WTO than in the four
85. Id. art. 17(6)(I).
86. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 4(1), reprinted in
H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Seas. 1533 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement on Subsi-
dies). The member believed to be maintaining the subsidy "shalr' enter into consulta-
tions "as quickly as possible." Id. art. 4(3).
87. Id. art. 4(4). The rules and procedures that govern DSU panels also apply to
panels established by the DSB to review countervailing measure disputes. See Final Act,
art. 1(2), app. 2.
88. Agreement on Subsidies, supra note 86, art. 4(6), (7).
89. Id. art. 4(8). The Agreement on Subsidies provides that proceedings before the
WTO Appellate Body shall not exceed sixty days and that the appellate report "shall" be
adopted by the DSB and "unconditionally accepted" by the disputants, unless the DSB
decides by "consensus" not to adopt the appellate report. Id. art. 4(9).
90. Id. art. 4(10).
91. See Sharp Increase Seen in WTO Disputes, Including Many from Developing
Countries, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1634 (Oct. 23, 1996) [hereinafter Sharp Increase].
92. Id. at 1634.
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years before the WTO." 93 Some believe that this early, frequent
resort to the WTO is a sign that the members have confidence in
its dispute settlement mechanisms.
9 4
These WTO cases span the spectrum of traded goods. Agri-
cultural cases include disputes arising out of U.S. objections to
South Korea's slow import clearance procedures for agricultural
products;95 European Union (E.U.) restraints on banana exports
from Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico;96 E.U. re-
strictions on grain exports from Canada;97 the E.U. ban on im-
ports of meat produced with growth hormones;98 Hungarian ag-
ricultural export subsidies;99 objections by Thailand, India,
Malaysia, and Pakistan to the U.S. ban on wild shrimp im-
ports;100 Japanese testing of apples exported from the United
States;' 10 desiccated coconut exports from the Philippines to
Brazil; 102 and Australian restrictions on uncooked salmon ex-
ports from Canada.108
Intellectual property cases that have been brought before
the WTO include cases arising out of U.S. and E.U. complaints
over Japan's failure to afford copyright protection to sound re-
93. Phytosanitary, Investment, Standards Issues are Future Trends in WTO Dispute
Settlement, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1312 (Aug. 14, 1996) [hereinafter Phytosanitary].
94. See Sharp Increase, supra note 91, at 1634.
95. See U.S. Seeks WTO Talks with Korea on Customs Clearance Procedures, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 864 (May 29, 1996); U.S. Brings Korean Food Issues to World
Trade Organization, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 606 (Apr. 5, 1995).
96. See WTO Dispute Panel Begins Hearing on EU Banana Regime Complaint by
U.S., 13 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1423 (Sept. 11, 1996); Ecuador, Mexico, U.S. Request
WTO Consultations on EU Banana Regime, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 206 (Feb. 7, 1996).
97. See Canada Seeks WTO Panel on EU Grain Regulations, 12 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1573 (Sept. 20, 1995).
98. See WTO Dispute Panel to Hear U.S. Case Against EU Meat Ban Next Month,
Official Says, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1447 (Sept. 18, 1996) [hereinafter WTO Dispute
Panel]; U.S. Files WTO Complaint Against EU Ban on Meat Imports with Hormones, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 160 (Jan. 31, 1996).
99. See U.S. Asks for Talks with Hungary Over Subsidies for Farm Exports, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 653 (Apr. 17, 1996).
100. See WTO to Establish Panel on Canadian Complaint Against EU Ban on Hor-
mone-Treated Beef Imports, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1630 (Oct. 23, 1996); Four Asian
Nations Ask United States for WTO Consultations on Shrimp Ban, 13 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1593 (Oct. 16, 1996).
101. See U.S. Calls for WTO Consultations with Japan on its Imported Apple Phyto-
sanitary Standards, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1598 (Oct. 16, 1996).
102. See WTO Panel Rules Against Philippines in Complaint Against Brazil Tax on
Coconuts, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1633 (Oct. 23, 1996).
103. See Canada Seeks WTO Action on Australian Salmon Ban, 14 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 486 (Mar. 12, 1997).
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cordings made before 1971;104 India and Pakistan's failures to ex-
tend patent protection to U.S. pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical products; 105 and Portugal's noncompliance with the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights.
106
WTO disputes include major automobile controversies be-
tween Japan and the United States, 107 Japan and Brazil, 108 the
E.U. and Indonesia,109 and the United States and Brazil. 110 Thus
far, the WTO has undertaken to resolve two significant textile
controversies, one which Costa Rica initiated against the United
States concerning limits on cotton underwear imports"' and a
second which India filed against the United States over restric-
tions on certain wool garment imports. 112  Other major WTO
cases have involved Venezuelan and Brazilian exports of refor-
mulated gasoline to the United States, 113 the Japanese liquor tax
104. See EU Seeks Separate WTO Consultations on Japan Sound Recording Copy-
rights, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 917 (June 5, 1996); U.S. Launches WTO Case Against
Japan Over Illegal Copying of U.S. Recordings, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 228 (Feb. 14,
1996).
105. See India Accepts Formation of WTO Panel Sought by U.S. on Drug, Chemical
Patents, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1816 (Nov. 27, 1996); U.S. Calls for WTO Dispute
Panel on Pakistan Intellectual Property, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1177 (July 17, 1996).
106. See U.S., Portugal Settle Dispute Over Patent Protection Under WTO, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1566 (Oct. 9, 1996).
107. See U.S.-Japan Auto Consultations Under WTO End with No Progress, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 120 (June 14, 1995); Japan Files Case with Trade Body in Fight with
U.S. Over Auto Sanctions, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 891 (May 24, 1995).
108. See Brazil's Cardoso and Japan's Hashimoto Make Some Progress in WTO Auto
Talks, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1411 (Sept. 11, 1996); Japan Seeks WTO Talks on Bra-
zilian Auto Policy, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1280 (Aug. 7, 1996).
109. See EU Files Complaint with WTO Over Indonesian National Car Policy, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1566 (Oct. 9, 1996).
110. See United States, Brazil to Hold Additional Consultations on Auto Regime, 14
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 184 (Jan. 29, 1997).
111. See WTO Appellate Ruling has Little Impact on U.S. Use of Safeguards, USTR
Says, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 261 (Feb. 12, 1997); U.S.-Costa Rica Meet Over Com-
plaint on U.S. Limits on Underwear Imports, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 207 (Feb. 7,
1996) [hereinafter U.S.-Costa Rica Meet].
112. See WTO Panel Rules Against United States in Case of Woven Wool Shirts from
India, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 47 (Jan. 8, 1997).
113. See WTO Dispute Mechanism to be Tested in U.S.-Venezuela Gasoline Dispute,
12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 617 (Apr. 5, 1995). This dispute was the first submitted under
the new WTO dispute settlement rules. See id. at 617. Venezuela and Brazil prevailed
before the initial WTO panel and Appellate Body. See Appellate Body Faults U.S. in Gas
Case, But Reverses on Conservation Exception, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 703 (May 1,
1996); United States Files Appeal in Reformulated Gasoline Case, 13 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 271 (Feb. 21, 1996). Recently, Venezuela accused the United States of moving
slowly to implement the WTO ruling. See Brazil, Venezuela Claim U.S. Slow to Imple.
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system, 114 the Helms-Burton Act,115 and Japanese restrictions on
imports of photographic film.
116
Although an exhaustive analysis of the numerous contro-
versies that formally have entered the WTO's dispute settlement
system is beyond the scope of this Article, it is possible to discern
at least two important patterns from the foregoing cases. First,
not only is the frequency with which member countries invoke
WTO dispute resolution vastly greater than under GATT's prior
processes, but the rate at which developing countries are using
the WTO as a forum for resolving trade disputes also has risen
dramatically. "Ninety percent of disputes brought before the
GATT involved major developed countries such as the United
States, European Union, Japan, or Canada."117 In contrast, fifty
percent of the disputes filed during the WTO's first year were
brought by developing countries." 8  Developing countries
(including several in Latin America) have freely invoked the new
WTO dispute settlement mechanisms, against both developed
and developing nations. 119 The Director of the WTO Secretariat
has opined that the WTO system gives developing countries a
new sense of enfranchisement.
120
Second, although it is too early to conclude that the WTO
dispute settlement devices are completely successful, the early
cases show that these devices can resolve trade disputes effec-
ment Gasoline Rulings, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 161 (Jan. 29, 1997).
114. See WTO Body Passes Along Report Adverse to Japan's Liquor Laws, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1702 (Nov. 6, 1996); WTO Panel Said to Uphold U.S., EU in Case Over
Japanese Liquor Taxes, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 917 (June 5, 1996).
115. See EU Formally Requests WTO Talks Over Cuba Sanctions Legislation, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 762 (May 8, 1996). In February 1997, the United States declared that
it would not participate in these WTO dispute proceedings, ostensibly on the grounds
that the WTO panel assigned to the case "lacks competence to adjudicate a national se-
curity issue." U.S. Says WTO Panel Not Competent to Judge Cuba Dispute, Hopes to Set-
tle, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 351 (Feb. 26, 1997).
116. See Panel Members Agreed to for U.S.-Japan Film Dispute, 14 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 9 (Jan. 1, 1997); U.S. Seeks WTO Panel Proceedings in Dispute Over Japan's Film
Market, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1296 (Aug. 14, 1996).
117. Sharp Increase, supra note 91, at 1634.
118. See Developing Countries Now Prime Users of WTO Dispute Procedures, Official
Says, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 596 (Apr. 10, 1996) [hereinafter Developing Countries].
Despite the surge in filings by developing nations, the United States remains the most
frequent user of the WTO system. See WTO Dispute Panel, supra note 98, at 1447
(explaining that, as of September 1996, the United States had submitted seventeen cases
to the WTO, "more than any other country").
119. See Developing Countries, supra note 118, at 597.
120. See Sharp Increase, supra note 91, at 1634.
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tively. In August 1996, a member of the Appellate Body revealed
that, "[o]ne-third of the cases filed under the WTO rules are be-
ing settled."' 2' Two significant successes, in cases where the
disputes did not settle during consultations, are the U.S.-Japan
sound recording dispute and the U.S.-Japan liquor tax contro-
versy. 122 One factor that may be contributing to this success,
and which is unavailable in a bilateral context, is the growing
practice of WTO members to join in bringing complaints:
"multiple complainants brings more pressure on the targeted
government to change its practices." 123
III. THE EVOLUTION OF FTAA DISPUTE RESOLUTION
SYSTEMS
Now that a body of dispute resolution experience has devel-
oped within MERCOSUR, NAFTA, and the WTO, it appears that
dispute resolution under a future FTAA is likely to take one of
three shapes. Following the 1998 Santiago Summit, the Ameri-
can democracies could decide to: 1) directly and fully transplant
one of the region's existing dispute settlement systems, i.e., ei-
ther that of MERCOSUR, NAFTA, or the WTO, into the FTAA,
2) disregard all of the existing trade dispute resolution mecha-
nisms and erect entirely new processes, 124 or 3) combine specific
features of the MERCOSUR, NAFTA, or WTO processes into a
hybrid dispute resolution structure and, as necessary, fill any
gaps with new processes or structures.
Although some support exists for the first approach, 12 5 it is
unlikely to be chosen for several reasons. One significant, and
possibly determinative, obstacle to complete replication of the
WVTO processes in an FTAA is the standing WTO Appellate Body
and the perceived diminution of national sovereignty implicit in
such an institution. Citing sovereignty concerns, the United
121. See Phytosanitary, supra note 93, at 1313.
122. See U.S., Japan Announce Resolution of Dispute Over Sound Recordings, 14
Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 170 (Jan. 29, 1997); USTR Barshefsky Praises Ruling on Japan
Liquor Tax Revision, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 285 (Feb. 19, 1997).
123. See Phytosanitary, supra note 93, at 1313. At the same time, the presence of
multiple parties increases the complexity of disputes and, for that reason, may hamper
effectiveness. See Sharp Increase, supra note 91, at 1634.
124. This option might involve the study and duplication of dispute settlement
mechanisms from international accords outside the trade context.
125. Canada has proposed that FTAA dispute settlement procedures be modeled on
WTO processes. See Three Framework Proposals, supra note 12, at 357.
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States never has definitively agreed to be bound by WTO rul-
ings.1 26 Moreover, the Latin American democracies simply may
not be prepared in the short-term to submit to a permanent, su-
pra-national adjudicatory tribunal in trade matters.
27 In the
words of Ambassador Ambler Moss, "[c]ountries in this hemi-
sphere are extremely jealous about their sovereignty."1
28 Putting
this significant difficulty aside, the frequency of use and early
success of the WTO's dispute settlement framework make it an
otherwise attractive model for transplantation into the Western
Hemisphere. At the same time, expansion of NAFTA may be
neither politically palatable to key Latin American nations nor
possible absent a grant of fast-track authority to the Clinton
Administration in the very near future. 129  In practice,
126. The WTO implementing legislation passed by Congress reserves to the United
States the right to second-guess every WTO ruling involving the country as well as the
right to withdraw from the WTO altogether in the event the United States does not wish
to comply with an adverse WTO ruling. See Kendall W. Stiles, The New WTO Regime:
The Victory of Pragmatism, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 3, 37-38 (1995). Moreover, to secure
passage of such legislation, the Clinton Administration had to assuage Senator Bob
Dole's sovereignty concerns by agreeing to support the formation of a "WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Review Commission." See Documents Relating to the Clinton Administration's
Agreement with Sen. Robert Dole (R-Kan) Concerning the Uruguay Round Agreement,
Issued by the White House Nov. 23, 1994, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1865 (Nov. 30, 1994).
As proposed, this five-judge court would review the validity of all WTO decisions
against the United States, and members of Congress, in turn, could use the court's find-
ings to seek the United States withdrawal from the WTO. See id. As of August 1996,
Congress had not approved legislation creating the Commission. See Dole Vows to De-
fend U.S. Sovereignty Against Infringement by WTO, Enforce Trade Laws, 13 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1328 (Aug. 21, 1996).
127. All of the dispute resolution panels in MERCOSUR and NAFTA are ad hoc in
nature. To date, efforts to create a MERCOSUR Court of Justice have proven futile,
largely due to opposition by Brazil. See MERCOSUR Countries to Establish Suprana-
tional Bank and Court, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 980 (June 12, 1996). It appears that
Americans are unwilling to accept the sacrifices of national sovereignty implicit in the
creation of a standing international adjudicatory tribunal. As the OAS recently con-
cluded:
Unfortunately, because of the different levels of development among the
countries, the demands for compatibility regarding policies of protection and
the need for the observance of a minimum level of coherence at the macro-
economic policy level, do not augur well for the achievement, in the near fu-
ture, of an advanced integration scheme in the Americas, such as a customs
union.
Toward Free Trade, supra note 4, at 37.
128. Ambassador Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Address at the University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review Symposium on Free Trade in the Western Hemisphere (Mar. 21,
1997).
129. See Ambler Moss & Stephen Lande, A Critical Year for Hemispheric Free Trade:
Can Countries Agree on a Blueprint?, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 507 (1997)
("Lacking fast-track authority, however, the United States may not have the credibility
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MERCOSUR's dispute settlement system is so dependent on in-
tervention by the MERCOSUR presidents that it simply does not
provide a workable method of settling disputes on a hemispheric
scale. 13
0
It appears equally unlikely that the FTAA negotiators will
completely disregard existing mechanisms. First, although we
have only a very limited body of experience with dispute settle-
ment under MERCOSUR (six years), NAFTA (three years), and
the WTO (two years), it would be foolish to discount this data.
Presupposing that the parties do not begin formal negotiation of
the FTAA's dispute settlement provisions until 2000, a relatively
extensive body of dispute resolution information will exist. Sec-
ond, at the Miami Summit, the leaders of the American democ-
racies made a commitment to build the FTAA "on existing
subregional and bilateral arrangements in order to broaden and
deepen hemispheric economic integration and to bring the
agreements together."'31 Moreover, the substantial work under-
taken by the OAS in compiling data on the dispute resolution
devices used in prevailing trade arrangements in the Americas
ensures that those devices will not be ignored in the forthcoming
FTAA negotiations.
For these reasons, it now seems likely that bits and pieces of
the MERCOSUR, NAFTA, and WTO dispute settlement proc-
esses will be melded into a new and distinct system for use in
the FTAA. The hybrid ultimately crafted by the parties will be
shaped by various factors, some of which are unknown today, but
which should become clearer in a matter of months or a few
years. Despite the presence of these unknown variables, it ap-
pears probable that any dispute resolution system adopted by
the year 2005 will contain several dynamic features. As ex-
plained below, this dynamism ultimately will prove to be critical
to the success of the FTAA's dispute settlement mechanisms, in
particular, and the FTAA, in general.
to achieve its preferred approach [to hemispheric integration]."). Id. at 538.
130. "Even Mercosur's smallest disputes have tended to go up for settlement by na-
tional presidents." Michael Reid, A Lopsided Union-Brazil is Mercosur's Dominant
Power Yet Much of Brazil Doesn't Much Care, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1996, at S9.
131. Declaration of Principles, supra note 2, at 811.
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A. Identifying the Unknown Variables
Factors that will shape the future structure of FTAA dispute
resolution include external developments beyond the immediate
control of the American democracies as well as matters within
the FTAA process itself. The former category includes, among
others, the political stability of some of the fledgling American
democracies, 3 2 the ability of the nations to successfully bridge
vast cultural differences, 33 and future perceptions about the
success or failure of the MERCOSUR, NAFTA, and WTO dispute
settlement mechanisms.
Other variables, which are unclear today but which soon
may become clearer, include the path to be taken by the Ameri-
can democracies in negotiating an FTAA, the scope of the free
trade agreement, and developments within the recently estab-
lished working group on Dispute Resolution. The most com-
monly discussed routes to an FTAA are as follows: hemispheric
negotiations in which each country is represented individually;
country-by-country accession to a pre-existing trading group
until all American nations are included; and the formation of
several regional trading blocs that are later linked together via
bloc-to-bloc negotiations. 1 4 Presumably, a WTO-plus approach
would make adoption of the WTO dispute resolution processes
more likely. Similarly, a decision to integrate the hemisphere
through expansion of NAFTA would make NAFTA's dispute set-
tlement mechanisms the sensible choice. In contrast, the effect
that hemispheric negotiations or bloc-to-bloc talks would have on
the shape of FTAA dispute resolution is not obvious. The March
1998 Santiago Summit may provide insights into these matters.
132. Recent political turmoil in Ecuador and Paraguay reminds us that the young
American democracies remain quite fragile. See David Scott Palmer, Peru and Ecuador
Juggle Democracy and Free-Market Reforms, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 4, 1997, at
19; The General Loses: Paraguay, ECONOMIST, May 4, 1996, at 40.
133. "The most obvious effect of hemispheric integration, however, would be to join
the Anglos of the North with the Latinos of the South, as NAFTA was able to do in North
America. The process of integration across such political and ethnic divides is undenia-
bly difficult, as Mexico and the United States are beginning to learn." Kenneth W. Ab-
bott & Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration in the Americas: "A Work in Progress,"
14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 493, 509 (1994).
134. See FTAA Working Groups Prepare for Vice-Ministerial in Bogota, 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 2011 (Dec. 6, 1995); Officials Expect FTAA Liberalization to be Less than
NAFTA, MERCOSUR Levels, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1641 (Oct. 4, 1995).
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Unquestionably, the working group on Dispute Resolution
will significantly influence the shape of things to come. FTAA
working groups generally consist of a single representative from
each country, ordinarily a technical person versed in the particu-
lar field under study. 3 5 Each group meets every few months in
different locations throughout the hemisphere. 136 The working
groups generally take action by consensus 13 7 and each group pre-
sents its recommendations during ministerial meetings, possibly
after such recommendations have been reviewed by vice-
ministers.' 38 Presumably, the working group on Dispute Reso-
lution began its work during the summer of 1997, will present
recommendations as early as the March 1998 Santiago Summit,
and, thereafter, will be "transformed" into the group that even-
tually negotiates the FTAA's dispute settlement provisions. 139
B. The Evolving Features of Dispute Resolution
Under a Future FTAA
Knowing that, for all practical purposes, the dispute settle-
ment systems of MERCOSUR, NAFTA, and the WTO will be the
models for FTAA dispute resolution, it is safe to assume that the
FTAA negotiators and the working group on Dispute Resolution
will start their work by focusing on features that these systems
have in common. Four major points of convergence exist. First,
all three models provide for the resolution of general disputes
concerning the interpretation, application, or breach of the re-
spective underlying agreement(s). Second, all three models (with
the WTO being a minor exception) contain a general dispute set-
tlement process that progresses in three stages, from negotia-
tions or consultations, to intervention by high-level political offi-
135. Tramhel Interview, supra note 17.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. For example, the FTAA Working Group on Standards and Technical Barriers to
Trade recently presented its recommendation that "feixisting World Trade Organization
rules and principles on standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment pro-
cedures should be the basis of [FTAA negotiations on these matters]." See FTAA Group
Urges that WTO Rules on Standards be Basis of Talks, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 29 (Jan.
1, 1997).
139. See Moss & Lande, supra note 129, at 527 ('[Position papers floated by the ma-




cials (ministers), to panel arbitration. 14° Third, all three models
rely, to a significant degree, on ad hoc (as opposed to standing)
panels. Finally, the ultimate penalty for noncompliance in all
three dispute resolution systems is the suspension of trade
benefits or imposition of appropriate countermeasures. These
four features are likely to be replicated in dispute resolution un-
der the FTAA.
The intriguing point to ponder is what FTAA dispute settle-
ment may look like beyond these points of convergence. To some
degree, the answer lies in how the FTAA negotiators decide to
handle several issues. These issues include the institutional
structure they create to administer the free trade agreement,
whether antidumping and countervailing duty disputes are to be
addressed by the agreement, 141 and what accommodations they
provide in the agreement for the least-developed nations. These
matters, I contend, will encourage the negotiators to make FTAA
dispute resolution systems transitional or evolutionary in char-
acter.
The brief experience with dispute settlement within
MERCOSUR and NAFTA confirms that trading partners in the
Western Hemisphere are capable of successfully resolving their
trade disputes with one another absent a standing, supra-
national adjudicatory tribunal.142 Not all trade controversies are
resolved in picture perfect, procedurally precise ways or to the
complete satisfaction of all interested parties; however, the set-
tlements generated by ad hoc tribunals, supported by minimally-
140. The WTO dispute settlement process is different in the sense that it does not
explicitly escalate disputes to ministerial intervention (although high-level officials cer-
tainly may become involved at the consultations stage) and it follows panel arbitration
with the possibility of appeal to the WTO Appellate Body.
141. Professor Essary has argued, for example, that rather than extending the Chap-
ter 19 binational panel system of review to subsequent trade agreements, the United
States and its trading partners should try, initially, to harmonize their antidumping laws
and, later, replace those laws with a common competition law. See Melissa A. Essary,
77Te Sphinx Rises: An Examination of Antidumping Laws as the Emerging Trade
Weapon of Choice, in FREE TRADE AREA FOR THE AMERICAS: ISSUES IN ECONOMICS, TRADE
POLICY AND LAW 107, 108 (Joseph A. McKinney & Melissa A. Essary eds., 1995).
142. Professor Kozolchyk suggests that the "standard of commercial fairness born of
national self-interest and of the willingness to share a common economic and environ-
mental destiny" that underlies NAFTA allows each of the NAFTA parties to acquire "a
stake in the region's economic and environmental progress." Kozolchyk, supra note 10,
at 139. "It is for this reason that a regional association such as NAFTA ... does not re-
quire a supra-national court of compulsory jurisdiction and coercive sanctions to enforce
fairness of treatment; the most effective sanction is the loss of a market." Id.
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staffed secretariats, are sufficient to preserve the underlying
trade accords. 143 Moreover, the historical experience of the Latin
American countries supports the use of a minimal institutional
structure at the outset of the FTAA. 144
Nonetheless, over time, a more institutionalized form of dis-
pute resolution may prove to be necessary. This may occur if the
nations become dissatisfied with a dispute resolution scheme
that merely preserves the underlying trade agreement. Cer-
tainly, the FTAA should aspire to dispute settlement mecha-
nisms which accomplish more sophisticated objectives, such as
offsetting imbalances in bargaining power between the trading
partners or avoiding the problem of "relative gains" and the in-
equitable distribution of the benefits of integration. 145
Our brief experience with NAFTA confirms that antidump-
ing and countervailing duty disputes will present some of the
most frequent threats to cohesion in a future FTAA. The inno-
vative approach used first in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment'46 and now in NAFTA to address these concerns ought to be
duplicated, in some form, in the forthcoming hemispheric ac-
cord. 147 Considering that "the subject of unfair trade practices
has been one of the most difficult to address at all levels, be it
multilateral, plurilateral or bilateral,"'' 4 this task will not be an
easy one. One obstacle to the full transplantation of Chapter 19
is that a number of the American democracies lack the type of
trade remedy legislation necessary to operate this form of dis-
143. Both the MERCOSUR Secretariat (located in Montevideo, Uruguay) and the
NAFTA Secretariat (which has section offices in Washington, D.C., Mexico City, and Ot-
towa) operate with very small staffs.
144. According to Professor Abbott, the decision to provide a minimal institutional
structure for MERCOSUR was deliberate and intended to avoid the creation of new
"regional bureaucracies" of the type, officials thought, that partially were to blame for the
failure of prior Latin American integration schemes. See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, LAW
AND POLICY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE NAFTA AND WESTERN HEMISPHERIC
INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SYSTEM 176-77 (1995).
145. See 0. Thomas Johnson, Jr., Alternative Dispute Resolution in the International
Context: The North American Free Trade Agreement, 46 SMU L. REV. 2175, 2176-78
(1993); Luigi Manzetti, The Political Economy of MERCOSUR, 1993-94 J. INTER-AM.
STUD. & WORLD AFF. 101, 121; J.S. NYE, PEACE IN PARTS: INTEGRATION AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION IN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 84 (1971).
146. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M.
281 (1988).
147. This assumes that the parties do not choose to harmonize their antidumping
laws.
148. Toward Free Trade, supra note 4, at 29.
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pute resolution mechanism. 149 Furthermore, some in the United
States may question the ability of Latin American panelists to
produce objective rulings in future antidumping dispute proceed-
ings. 1
50
The dispute settlement structure of a future FTAA must, in
addition, account for the "wide differences in the levels of devel-
opment and size of economies existing in our Hemisphere."'
15
"One of the greatest challenges posed by the FTAA is to craft
rules that apply both to large, developed, and highly competitive
economies such as the United States and Canada, as well as to
smaller developing countries, in particular those in Central
America and the Caribbean."152 Any attempt at the start of the
FTAA to hold the smaller economies to legalistic, rule-oriented
dispute resolution processes may prove futile or counterproduc-
tive. 153 Recognizing this fact, the framers of the WTO provided
in Article 24 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
that:
At all stages of the determination of the causes of a dispute
and of dispute settlement procedures involving a least-devel-
oped country Member, particular consideration shall be given
to the special situation of least-developed country Members.
In this regard, Members shall exercise due restraint in raising
matters under these procedures involving a least-developed
country Member. If nullification or impairment is found to re-
sult from a measure taken by a least-developed country Mem-
ber, complaining parties shall exercise due restraint in asking
for compensation or seeking authorization to suspend the
application of concessions or other obligations pursuant to
149. See Gilbert R. Winham & Annie M. Finn, Accession to NAFTA: The Implica-
tions of Extending Chapter 19 Dispute Settlement on Antidumping and Countervailing
Duties, in FREE TRADE AREA FOR THE AMERICAS: ISSUES IN ECONOMICS, TRADE POLICY
AND LAW 100, 101 (describing the extensive substantive changes Mexico was required to
make in its trade law and regulations to accommodate Chapter 19 dispute resolution
processes) (Joseph A. McKinney & Melissa A. Essary eds., 1995).
150. "The American critics of NAFTA were especially concerned that Mexico would
not protect the individual rights of American exporters in Mexican domestic fora or be-
fore an international AD/CVD review panel containing Mexican jurists." Daniel S. Sulli-
van, Effective International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and the Necessary Condition
of Liberal Democracy, 81 GRO. LJ. 2369, 2409 (1993) (footnote omitted).
151. Declaration of Principles, supra note 2, at 812.
152. Toward Free Trade, supra note 4, at 45.




An FTAA dispute settlement regime that includes dynamic
elements and is open to evolution from pragmatism to legalism
can successfully address these three difficulties. The notion that
FTAA dispute resolution ought to be evolutionary, as opposed to
static, is neither new nor surprising. 155 The process of trade lib-
eralization that now makes an FTAA conceivable is itself a long
one that has unfolded only gradually. 156 Indeed, the primary
trading arrangements upon which FTAA dispute resolution will
be built are themselves evolutionary in character. MERCOSUR
began as little more than a free trade agreement, gradually
formed a (partial) common external tariff and, eventually may
become a full-fledged customs union. NAFTA seeks to reduce
tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade in North America gradu-
ally over a fifteen-year transition period. The WTO itself is the
result of incremental growth over a period of forty-eight years
from a single multilateral accord to a series of such accords
housed in a central institution.
What might this evolution look like? I envision, initially in
the FTAA, the type of minimal institutional structure for dispute
resolution we find in MERCOSUR and NAFTA, later evolving
into a limited, standing dispute settlement entity such as the
WTO Appellate Body. Also initially, the system may be heavily
weighted toward pragmatic, negotiated dispute settlement, rely-
ing on active intervention by high-level officials. During this
early stage, the only enclave of legalism may be a Chapter 19-
like mechanism. However, at the start, this device may apply
only to the relatively advanced economies (i.e., the United
States, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and
Venezuela). As the IFTAA matures, these processes could grow
in at least two distinct directions: 1) gradually, the antidump-
ing/countervailing duty dispute mechanism could be extended to
more nations, and 2) other types of disputes, such as general
154. Final Act, supra note 67, art. 24(1).
155. U.S. officials recognize that FTAA institutions are likely to be dynamic. See,
e.g., Barshefsky Sees Formal Institutions Evolving Gradually in FTAA and APEC, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 566 (Apr. 3, 1996) (reflecting the U.S. Trade Representative's be-
lief that the FTAA's "formal institutions" are likely to be evolutionary).
156. See David A. Pawlak, Learning from Computers: The Future of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 107, 118-21 (1995) (recounting in-
tegration efforts in the Americas).
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conflicts over the interpretation or application of the underlying
agreement, could become subject to more formal, rules-driven
means of dispute settlement. In a related context, Professor Ab-
bott has labeled this phenomenon "juridical and institutional
evolution based on social and technological evolution."'
157
Sound political reasons exist for adopting a dynamic ap-
proach. First, a legalistic approach may not be sustainable un-
der current circumstances. Professor Kozolchyk's description of
the competing forces of "tribalism" and "globalism" is helpful on
this point. Tribalism, he says, consists of "the clamoring by vir-
tually every 'sub-national' ethnic group for independence and
self-determination." 158 In contrast, globalism consists of "the on-
rushing integration of the international economy."'
159 He argues
that a relatively nonintrusive structure such as NAFTA, and not
supra-national federalism, is the most acceptable way of balanc-
ing these competing forces. This is the model most consistent
with "the nature of the modern nation state and with the limits
of man's cooperative impulses."'
160
Second, a flexible, evolutionary approach allows for the de-
velopment of a stronger foundation for the FTAA, before the full
weight of universally applicable, comprehensive trade obliga-
tions and strong regional institutions is placed on this new ar-
rangement. Once the Latin American democracies become more
institutionalized and the rewards of integration become real, the
"cooperative impulses" will rise and so too will the willingness of
the nations of the Western Hemisphere to be bound by more
formalistic dispute settlement mechanisms. As Kozolchyk ar-
gues, "this dilemma [between tribalism and globalism] vanishes
once I acquire a significant stake in my neighbor's well being and
vice-versa, because from that moment on, individual or national
self interest will require me to be for my neighbor and vice
versa." 161
157. Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of
the EC Model and the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 917, 919-20 (1992).
158. Kozolchyk, supra note 10, at 143.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 144.
161. Id. at 145.
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C. Anticipating the Dangers of Evolution
Although dynamism brings with it several essential benefits,
it also carries a few dangers. Such dangers arise for a number of
reasons. First, the evolution is likely to be lengthy162 and to "go
forward in fits and starts," subject to the "political mood swings"
of the thirty-four American constituencies. 163 Second, the FTAA
dispute settlement system is unlikely to produce many early suc-
cesses, if success is defined as the fair and effective resolution of
controversies. It may be, as Daniel Sullivan argues, that liberal
democracy is a necessary condition for effective, far-reaching in-
ternational dispute settlement mechanisms; that is, "without a
grouping of liberal democratic forms of government, the estab-
lishment and operation of effective [dispute settlement mecha-
nisms] will not take place."'164
The slow progress and lack of early success may tempt the
United States to impose its will on its trading partners, as the
United States clearly possesses the ability to do, 165 in a way that
offends its hemispheric neighbors and further slows the integra-
tion process. Moreover, there is a danger that, as the early
euphoria surrounding the achievement of formal integration
wanes, the FTAA parties will not vigorously push the FTAA's
dispute resolution mechanisms from an initial state of pragma-
tism toward greater legalism. "Legalists claim that [pragmatic]
practices turned GATT law into 'soft' law and ultimately caused
its erosion.' ' 166 The risk here is that if the FTAA mechanisms
never evolve toward increased legalism, they too may erode or
need to be abandoned. 167
162. See Gary Hufbauer, International Trade Organizations and Economies in Tran-
sitio A Glimpse of the Twenty-First Century, 26 L. & POL. INT'L BUS. 1013, 1016 (1995)
(stating that "open markets work as a tide that raises all boats, but over a generation,
not within two or three years").
163. Id. at 1014-15.
164. See Sullivan, supra note 150, at 2397.
165. "The United States is undoubtedly the largest trading partner in the Western
Hemisphere. It represents 69 percent of the market (gross domestic product) of the re-
gion." Toward Free Trade, supra note 4, at 10.
166. Azar M. Khansari, Searching for the Perfect Solution: International Dispute
Resolution and the New World Trade Organization, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
183, 187 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
167. See Abbott, supra note 157, at 944-46 (suggesting that an integration scheme
that fails to evolve weak dispute settlement institutions into strong central dispute-




As we reflect on the Miami Summit of two years ago and
look forward to next year's Santiago Summit, the idea that a
hemispheric free trade area actually may come to pass in the
next decade ought to be a source of great hope for the economic
prosperity and political freedom of Americans. The practical
success of the FTAA, and its ability to tangibly improve the lives
of residents of the Western Hemisphere, inextricably will be
linked to the ability of its dispute resolution systems to effi-
ciently, effectively, and fairly settle conflicts between the par-
ties.16 8 Someday, we may look back upon the decisions made by
those involved in creating the FTAA in these final years of the
twentieth century and understand just how crucial a role they
played in the history of our hemisphere. For the time being,
however, we should relish the opportunity we have to imagine
what the next generation of international dispute resolution re-
gimes might look like.
168. Cf. Rules-Based Dispute Settlement Called Useless Without Enforcement, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1266 (July 26, 1995) (recounting Canadian Trade Minister's statement
that "the credibility of the WTO will hang on the success of its dispute settlement
mechanism").
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